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Psychoanalysis does not have an easy stand in documenting what “clinical facts” are. 
This paper proposes to use an established research tool such as Conversation Analysis 
(CA) in order to analyze how psychoanalytic conversation is performed in the consulting 
room. The vicinity of CA-approaches and psychoanalytic intuitions is documented by 
selected examples. We provide an outline of CA-research in psychoanalysis. Finally we 
debate whether psychoanalysis be science or hermeneutics; these positions are seen as 
two sides of a coin. One side is always in the dark. Metaphorically speaking, the future 
will have the task to bring this coin to an upright stand which can be managed only when 
the coin is given a thrilling turn by acknowledging that both, hermeneutics and science, in 
far reaching dimensions ignored the (micro-)social dimension of the psychoanalytic 
endeavor: conversation, talk-in-interaction. This will help to more clearly get in view 




In recent years many efforts were undertaken to understand what psychoanalysis is and 
what psychoanalysts do. For former generations it sufficed to define psychoanalysis as 
the science created by Freud. What psychoanalysts do could be described by the word 
“interpretation”. Several developments darkened this idyllic picture:   
1.  Many studies conducted by experienced psychoanalytic psychotherapy researchers 
(see for an overview Bachrach et al,. 1991) tried to demonstrate systematic differences 
between “psychoanalysis proper” and “psychodynamic psychotherapy”. This difference 
could not convincingly be established (Sandell, 2012). In high frequency psychoanalyses 
not only interpretations were used but analysts also provided advice and emotional 
support (Bush & Meehan 2011); in once-a-week psychodynamic psychotherapies also 
unconscious material was interpreted in addition to advice and social support. 
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2. To define the “common ground” of the multitude of psychoanalytic schools turned out 
to be increasingly difficult. The Rome Conference papers profoundly demonstrated that 
every author - pretending to know what the “common ground” was - just figured out his 
personal position. Titles were “Common ground: The centrality of the oedipus complex” 
(Feldman 1990), “The search for the common ground” (Schafer, 1990), “Empathy. A 
common ground” (Feiner et al., 1994), “Countertransference: The emerging common 
ground” (Gabbard, 1995), “The illusion of common ground” (Green 2005), and, finally, 
ironic titles like “Common (under)ground of psychoanalysis: The question of a 
Weltanschauung revisited” (Figueira, 1990).  
3. David Tuckett (1993) pointed out that there is even no agreement what “clinical facts” 
are; “facts” appear in the horizon of a given theory. Therefore Tuckett lamented of having 
Winnicottian, Kohutian, Bionian, Kleinian and classical facts and today one could add a 
lot more, e.g., Bollasian or interpersonal/relational “facts”.  
4. Studying psychoanalysts-at-work (Tuckett, 2012) allows to regain the domain of 
conversation. This rediscovery will open the door to a world of a rich caleidoscopic 
shimmer in all colours of the human rainbow.  
 
For example an EPF working group identified 6 types of interventions psychoanalysts 
have described (Tuckett et al., 2008, p. 140): 
1. Maintaining the basic setting 
2. Adding an element to facilitate unconscious process 
3. Questions, clarifications, reformulations, aimed at making matters conscious 
4. Designating here and now emotional and phantasy meaning of the situation with 
the analyst 
5. Constructions directed at providing elaborated meaning 
6. Sudden and apparently glaring reactions not easy to relate to a certain analyst’s 
normal method 
 
This group recommends shifting attention more on what the analyst does. Such a 
comparison of what psychoanalysts do, what kind of inter-action psychoanalysis is comes 
in view. Such a comparative approach unavoidably discovers how different analysts work 
– beyond every idealistic description and self-description. Dana Birksted-Breen warns 
about the risks of this endeavor: 
 
The novelty of this comparative method lies in a dual shift in perspective: from the 
patient to the analyst and from emphasizing a single ‘truth’ to valuing difference. 
Instead of the traditional discussion of a ‘case’ in which the leader and participants 
suggest a better or deeper understanding of the clinical material, there is a radical shift 
of focus towards understanding the analyst herself, what she is doing in the 
psychoanalytic encounter, and for what reason. The attempt to elucidate the implicit 
model of the presenter/analyst shifts attention away from evaluation and towards 
understanding (Tuckett et al., 2008, p. 2) 




Having presented a clinical report the German analyst Helmut Hinz echoes in the same 
direction: “To recognize difference is the beginning of recognizing the richness of the 
universe of reality” (Hinz, in Tuckett et al., 2008, p. 109). 
 
What psychoanalysis is begins to be defined in terms of what psychoanalysts do. To 
apply CA-methods to psychoanalysis endorses that line of thinking. CA contributes to 
precisely describe how it is done. This seems to be a remedy for this confusing situation 
and it is in good psychoanalytic tradition. Anna O. termed what Breuer and she had done 
together as “talking cure”. Today, this valuable metaphor   is much more to the point than 
ever. In psychoanalysis no “variables” are “applied”; simply two people talk together 
although in a quite specific way. When directing attention to conversation we have a 
chance to catch sight of what “clinical facts” are.  
 
The aim of our paper is to inform about some of the research results and outline further 
possibilities. This seems politically important. Influential parties in evidence-based 
medicine have constructed manuals instead of old fashioned textbooks of therapy in 
which a therapist is someone producing preformulated text blocks with respect to 
diagnoses. Psychotherapy in general is in danger to be reduced to something like a trivial 
machine without own reflection. Against this trend it might be important that 
psychoanalysts remind psychotherapy in general as a highly specialized and creative 
form of dialogue and directing research to analyze the special ingredients of 
psychoanalytic conversation as opposed to other therapies. 
 
Conversation – A core concept 
The formula of “talking cure” opens sight for the core questions of psychotherapy 
research: What are the qualities of a “healing conversation” (Symington, 2006)? What are 
the details? How to describe conversational practices with the aim of “healing”? And: 
How come that conversation influences cognition? If we glance into the consulting rooms 
of therapeutic neighbors like music therapy or art therapy or even cognitive behavior 
therapy we are endowed with a superior argument: more than 90 percent of activities 
there are not the special ingredients which a given therapeutic school proclaims to be 
effective. No, it’s just - talking! And, of course, at the same time psychoanalysts could 
stick to the claim “Not Just Talking” (Pain, 2009); conversation analysts see this as the 
gift to therapy and they did begin to analyze “Talk as therapy” (Pawelczyk, 2011). In this 
seeming contradiction of “Just talking” vs. “Not just Talking” we see how psychoanalysis 
is formed by a central paradox: Therapy = Talk and Therapy ≠ Talk. Both equations are 
valid at the same time. Psychoanalytic patients and their analysts do talk and, according 
to Freuds (1917) didactic formula nothing happens but an “exchange of words”. Yet, still 
more happens. As “talking cure” psychoanalysis operates in a medium which transcends 
the logic of secondary process thinking, it comes close to primary process thinking where 
these logical contradictions are tolerated and creatively processed. But how is it done? 
And the question then arises as to the difference between psychoanalysis and other 
therapies? 
 
To prefer “talking cure” over “chimney sweeping” - the other term Anna O. unforgettably 
coined for her psychoanalytic experience - has good reasons. Talking is the most neutral 
description for what happens in a treatment room; although, of course, not every talk is 
treatment or psychoanalysis. Of course, Freud did not exclude gesture and tears, mimic 




and prosody, nor pause and silence. Explaining (Freud, 1926) how to introduce the basic 
rule he used the term “conversation”. In such a conversation it happens that certain kinds 
of experience are condensed in a metaphor like “chimney sweeping”. Others, often heard, 
are e.g., “diving deeply” or the (religious) metaphor of “confession” and many others. 
Anna O’s “chimney sweeping” was later replaced by Freud by “purification”.  
 
These metaphors encompass a smaller or greater part of conversation. They never contain 
all aspects. Metaphors for conversation become part of conversation when they are 
occasionally used as frames for the ongoing conversation. As such they are part of 
conversation and, at the same time, create a reflective stance for conversation. Thus, 
conversation or “talking” is the superior concept one has to begin with. 
 
Why not speak of communication, but of Conversation?  
Early communication research used a technological model where one speaker is 
analogized with a transmitter, sending a coded message to a receiver who has to decode 
the message (Krippendorf, 1969). This technological provides an instruction for learning 
“communicative behavior”, to teach people to “say what you really mean”. It is widely 
used in mass communication, social psychology of groups and in many other areas like 
coaching, communication trainings etc. 
 
The technological model ignores many highly relevant dimensions of human affairs 
(Peräkylä, 2004). One of them is that a listener pays attention to a speaker! What might 
be the reason for this active contribution by the listener? Before he knows that a 
“message” is to be “decoded” the listener listens! How is it done that they don’t start 
talking together at the same moment? One must simply remember that babies do this and 
one without further instruction grasps that there must be a history in it. And more: A 
listener pushes back of his mind any irrelevant “noise”. Before he can “decode” he has to 
differentiate the “noise” from the rest. This active participation of the listener is 
completely overlooked in the technological model, but it is highly relevant for 
conversation. Participants in conversation have an implicit knowledge of this dimension. 
One can observe how speakers end their contribution with what CA-researchers call a 
“tag”, a little sound like “eh!”, in German some use “gell”, in Switzerland “o:dr” 
(“oder?”) is used; in British conversation one encounters “isn’t it?”. Obviously these 
activities are directed to activate the listeners attention and in some cases to provoke the 
listener to give a prosodic sound that he still listens: “hm:m”. Another problem is how a 
listener might be sure to have “decoded the message correctly”? He cannot have a 
measure for correct translation before the beginning – which would be required in the 
technological model. Otherwise a “decoding” of the message would not work. 
 
In conversational activities there is more than the conveyance of information. The 
technological model is a “folk theory” of talking. Reddy (1979) termed it the “Conduit 
metaphor”. Conversation is more. It consists of, at least, three components that have to be 
identified from the outset: A listener has to differentiate being addressed from the content 
and he has to use this difference in order to produce understanding. This is the full circle. 
Conversation does not happen from one to the other (this might be the case in military 
commands), it demands active participation on both sides. 
 




Conceptual obstacles of a technological model are easily to overcome if we do speak of 
“conversation” in a tradition that goes back to Wittgenstein. Language is less a 
transporter system for “information” but a form of human practice. Thus, CA-researchers 
reject a technological blueprint for human and naturalistic affairs as it denies the sociable, 
gregarious dimension, the convivial element in conversation. Originally, conversation 
was not a scientific concept. It was meant for the coming together, for the social 
gathering of well educated people in a friendly manner. The place where they met was 
the salon (Miller, 2006, p. 71) like the salon of Rachel Varnhagen in Berlin or the 
Ephrussi family’s salon in Paris or those in St. Petersburg or Moscow so marvelously 
described by Tolstoj. What these people did was called “doing conversation”. Their 
conversation followed certain rules all designed to support one aim: conversation should 
not stop, it should go on. Thus, tone had to avoid themes like religion or politics which 
might result in quarrels or serious controversies. Topics should be changed before it came 
to a decision because a decision in a question of relevance might someone feel excluded. 
Exclusion was considered a serious violation of conversational rules. Another rule was to 
care for the inclusion of everyone, even women. Those who were not excluded where 
considered members in conversational participation. Persons excluded should be re-
“membered” into the conversational circle. So they could be re-”minded”. Etymology 
reflects the idea that to be re-minded meant to become healthy again by being re-
membered, by being re-included in the community.  
 
In contrast, a scientific conversation had completely different aims. Scientific questions 
urge to be answered, they have a penchant for closure in order to turn oneself to other 
questions. If you want to know if an answer is “true” or “false” you have to debate it to 
the end, you cannot change topics or consider about someone being excluded. From this 
double origin of conversation the famous Freudian inseparable bond of “cure and 
research” herited (1927a, p. 256). His formulation includes both in order to make 
perceptible by scientifically guided self-reflection the healing effects of conversation. 
Healing is effected by re-including. 
 
Freud´s use of the term “conversation” displays several connotations. To analyze 
conversation and to analyze a “psyche” has a huge semantic overlap of meaning; 
everything you can analyze must come through the narrow passage of conversation, 
including all elusive phenomena as slips of the tongue, a glance, a gesture or a curious 
word used. Everything that can be heard and seen can become part of conversation 
analysis. Affect displays are included in this conception of conversation (Krause & 
Merten, 1999). Or vice versa: if it is not heard nor seen it cannot be noticed and then, not 
analyzed until it appears on the common screen of conversation. 
 
Psychoanalysts are interested in certain topics in their patients’ life which they think are 
repressed and refrain from appearing on the conversational screen. So we have a first (not 
the first) description of what analysts sometimes do: they actualize hidden dimensions 
excluded from conversation (Smith, 1991). They do this actualization in the medium of – 
conversation and cannot avoid this paradox. It follows, that even interpretations are 
embedded in conversation; they are part of conversational history. Much can be said to 
further analyze the How, When and Why of different kinds of actualizing activities. But 
for the moment we want to turn to another line of thinking. 
 




The Origins of CA 
Conversation analysis is the name for a research practice deriving from several traditions 
in sociology and sociolinguistics. It was Erving Goffman (1964, 1983) who directed 
attention to the phenomena of everyday verbal and nonverbal exchange between 
participants in interaction. He considered the difference between backstage and front 
stage in a very similar way as psychoanalysts, he saw how important “frames” of 
interaction are and could make plausible that these frames guide institutional 
conversation in a way perceptible for everyone, but largely ignored. In families, 
preschoolers are sometimes asked “Paul, do you know how much is two and two?” At 
school, then, the format of the question is changed: “How much is two and two – Paul?” 
The personal reference changes its place from the first utterance to the last. This format 
communicates meaning which is not in the words. It fits to classroom conversation 
(Gardner, 2013) which is different from family intimacy. Harold Garfinkel, another social 
scientist and founder of what he called “ethno-methodology” worked at similar problems 
and found that every subcultural ethnic community uses “methods” how they organize 
their conversations in order to make sure that there is “order at every point”. Even in 
excited quarrels one can find “orderliness”, but in times before Garfinkel (1967) neither 
participants nor observers could see it. 
 
It was Harvey Sacks (1978, 1980), a gifted young student of conversation, who coined 
the term of conversation analysis (CA). His lectures were later published by Gail 
Jefferson (1992); Sacks untimely died in an accident in 1975. Gail Jefferson and Emanuel 
A. Schegloff belong to the first who understood the enormous relevance of studying the 
details of conversation in everyday talk, in institutions as patient-doctor interactions, in 
classrooms or at court, and influenced others to pay special attention to the details of 
conversation among children. In all these different institutional places it could be shown 
how conversational routines as questions and answers, referencing to present or absent 
persons or practices like storytelling make influential differences. Even the expression of 
emotion, the regulation of affiliation, the production of laughter or gaze direction was 
analyzed and it could be demonstrated that in conversation not only words are exchanged 
but bodies participate in a way confirming the basic premise of “order at every 
point”. Jefferson (1984 a and b) could demonstrate this orderliness in such emotional 
moving interactions as “trouble talk” or, more positive, in how laughter is “organized”. 
Others have felt touched by the potential of CA to analyze psychotherapeutic processes in 
general more broadly. Madill et al. (2001) defined CA as “the study of talk in interaction 
and of how, through talk, people accomplish actions and make sense of the world around 
them” (p. 414). Forrester and Reason (2006) admit that CA might be “an exercise of 
disciplinary demystification” (p. 44) but they cannot see how CA deals with the 
“ontological status of the unconscious” (p. 53). Both papers focus on sequence 
organization of therapeutic talk and hope to gain a more detailed view of therapeutic 
practices.  
 
There is still the other line of thinking in CA, the analysis of category bound activities 
(Lepper, 2000; Sacks, 1980; Schegloff, 2007). Let’s have a short look at the case 
illustration used by Forrester and Reason (2006, p. 53). The patient has reported a dream. 
They, as observers, see “from a psychoanalytic-psychotherapeutic perspective”, that “the 
client offers the therapist a gift” (p. 48).  
 
To interprete a dream(-telling) as a “gift” constructs a metaphorical equation – by 
observers. Nothing is shown how participants, therapist and client, treat this episode. To 




criticize the therapist for not acknowledging the dream as a gift might be relevant from a 
clinical point of view. Clinical thinking is full of constructing metaphors of this kind. 
This is, what clinicians helpful do, it is one of the practices often used in doing 
psychoanalysis.  
 
CA analyzes such practice as category activity. How do participants create and introduce 
into conversation new categories such as metaphors (or others) used to self-describe what 
they are just talking about? Are there relevant places where such categorical 
constructions can be introduced? Which conversational problem of the participants is 
solved when one of them does this? How come that Anna O. suddenly used the metaphor 
of “talking cure” for the kind of conversation she had with Joseph Breuer? Metaphors are 
powerful conversational tools to condense conversational experience of both participants 
and sometimes they create a new level of reflection, sometimes they fail and next 
speakers refuse them or do not agree. Here is a chance to integrate metaphor analysis 
(Ahrens, 2012; Angus, 1996; Buchholz, 2007; Cameron & Maslen, 2010; Carveth, 1984; 
Quinn, 2010) and CA.  
 
A link between conversation and cognition (Molder & Potter, 2005) can be drawn. 
Leading cognitive linguist George Lakoff (1987) used “What categories reveal about the 
mind” as subtitle for his famous book and he drew on categories of very different kinds, 
logical and, of course, metaphorical. We have analyzed these links methodologically 
(Buchholz 2006) and used them empirically in our research about sexual offenders 
(Buchholz, Lamott & Mörtl, 2008; Mörtl et al., 2010). In our view, it is not that CA 
overlooks the “ontological status” of the unconscious; CA enriches psychoanalytic 
conceptions of the unconscious by focusing on other activities (sequences and categories) 
more than traditional conceptions of the unconscious do.  
Participants unconsciously use tacit skills for three purposes:  
a) to orient their contribution to a common activity focus (“What are we doing here 
together?”) – in conversation is a capability for cooperation. In the future one 
could describe the special kinds of cooperation patients display or refuse. 
b) to commonly organize – without conscious planning – their turn-by-turn 
organization; they “know” certain formats of talk, e.g., when a storyteller makes a 
pause but wants to continue or, alternatively, the listener may take the turn and 
pose a question; they “know” when it is interdicted to tell a joke (Sacks, 1978) or 
how to gossip (Bergmann, 1987) and violate moral rules of conduct (Hakulinen &  
Sorjonen, 2011; Bergmann, 1999; Pomerantz, 2012). This kind of tacit knowledge 
contributes to the overall organization of talking, in psychoanalytic observation it 
is widely ignored. Common organization means that there is a sense of sharing 
something together. 
c) to further process their common conversational tasks and aims embedded in a 
context of interactional organization. For example, when you hear a “thank you” 
you follow the rules of polite complementarity, e.g., “you are welcome”, “my 
pleasure” etc.). But therapists, when they hear at the end of an interview a “thank 
you” while shaking hands don’t respond this way. Therapists nod with their heads 
and keep silent sticking to their professional attitudes documenting that the 
interview was not an everyday kind of talk. Therapists use small violations of an 
everday-rule-of-conduct as professional markers for demonstrating the difference 
between everyday-types of conversation and the consulting room. This is an 
example for a general human sense of using self-produced context to produce a 
surplus of meaning (McHoul et al., 2008). 




In recent years a Finnish conversation analyst, Anssi Peräkylä, trained as a psychoanalyst, 
began to research psychoanalytic conversation. Psychoanalysis is talking, but, of course, 
not every talk is psychoanalysis (Peräkylä et al., 2008). So what details make the 
difference? To find this out is one aim of CA-research in psychoanalysis. It will result in 
a variety of knowledge of how psychoanalysts talk. Thus, CA-research is a powerful tool 
to contribute to important psychoanalytic questions, e.g., what clinical facts are. If you go 
back in the history to CA-research activities one is surprised to find how close this comes 
to psychoanalytic interests. This closeness has several dimensions: 
a) The kind of data is not numbers, but talk-in-action (Heritage & Clayman, 2010)  
b) The mode of careful observation is not global (“overall diagnosis” as in DSM or 
ICD) but directed to the details 
c) Conclusions go from gathering the details to the more global conceptions, or, as 
William Blake once said: “There is a world in every grain of sand”. 




These examples are not taken from the consultation room. They are a selection of early 
CA-research in order to show how these researchers are engaged in topics which Freud 
paid careful attention to. They are elusive phenomena, often overlooked. Jefferson in 
1996 published an article “On the Poetics of Ordinary Talk” which led her close to 
Freudian positions. She started with an observation: The poet’s job is it to arrange sounds 
and categories. She provided a few examples and then went further to a clinical question: 
“What is the difference between what the psychotic does and what the poet does?” (p. 4) 
She gathered examples of Freudian slips. Here are three of them: 
a) A record from the US-Crandall Show where the host is reading out a commercial for 
suits named “Bond’ Blue Chips”. His exact wording but was: 
 
“˜B[ig, [be)eautiful] from America’s [l]argest [cl[othier. [B)oh- Bond’s. Blondes, my 
goodness. Wuh that’s a Freudian Slip” (quoted from Jefferson, 1996, p. 6) 
 
Jefferson sees the double sound-row of the letters b and l and comments there is 
“something moving towards ‘blonds boo’”. This is a classical Freudian interpretation 
based on an exact analysis of what the speaker said. Freud saw a slip of the tongue 
composed of a conscious intention to say something interfering with another unconscious 
intention to say something different. The condition for the slip is this combination of 
conscious and unconscious intentions.  
 
Here is a second example from Jefferson: 
b) A plane made a rough landing and the stewardess a few seconds later announces: 
 
Stew: On behalf of the who(l)e f(r)ight - f(l)ight c(r)ew I’d like to thank you for flying 
Air California (p. 7) 




And Jefferson comments like a Freudian analyst using her countertransference: “‘Fright’, 
and how! Freudian Slips! Lots of nudging and grinning among us passengers. But then I 
thought, no, it’s one of those sound-selection things. As with dreep drop, blonds boo, 
flight foyed, here we are on the way to ‘fright cloo’” (p. 7) 
c) Jefferson informs about another type of slip based on category-formed errors. An 
example is when a male speaker, Larry, says: 
 
“Hi. I’m Carol’s sister - uh brother” (p. 10) 
 
This example is one of “categorization”: one’s self is wrongly categorized – and then 
corrected. Examples of this kind are well known in psychoanalysis. We mention them to 
counteract the prejudice that CA is anti-mentalistic or simply behaviorally oriented. CA is 
engaged in similar topics as psychoanalysis. If Freud had had the technology of audio- 
and video recording he would have used it with respect to his patients’ needs for 
anonymity. As in his days this technology was not available he had no other possibility 
than to ensure his readers that he had a “phonographic memory” as in the introduction to 
his 1916-17 “Introductory Lessons” (Freud, 1916-17).  
 
Senses and Embodiment 
The astonishing equivalence between CA and psychoanalysis goes further. CA analyzes 
talk in a manner including the body and senses and with an excellent attention to the 
details. Details are elusive and cannot be reproduced nor experimentally manipulated, but 
they are those hearable and viewable elements in the Freudian tradition that are 
considered able to show that there is unconscious activity. Schegloff (2007) explains his 
interest in how people acknowledge each other with a personal anecdote and an important 
observation: 
 
I often find myself walking on campus and encountering someone coming the other 
way who was an undergraduate student in my class. And we have this odd game of 
not-quite-mutual gaze. They look at me half expectantly, and as my eyes start coming 
to them they look away, figuring that there is no way I would recognize them as they 
recognize me, and to be caught looking at me like that would be . . . what? Intrusive? 
Presumptuous? Mocking? And if the pas de deux goes their way, we pass each other 
without ever meeting one another’s gaze and with no mutual acknowledgement; and if 
it goes my way, I trap them, and recognize them – sometimes by name which blows 
their mind – and we greet each other, and it’s very nice. This is the way the logic plays 
out when the very issue is whether there is to be any interaction at all in the first place. 




On the telephone, the parties are already in the interaction, so it plays out a 
bit differently, but the same logic is involved. I know him, but does he know me? and 
does he know that I know him? and does he know that I know that he knows me? 
(Schegloff, 2007, pp. 132-133).  
 
This inclusion of personal experience follows Freud in showing how his personal 
experience “from everyday” steered his scientific interests deeply. Important here that the 
interpersonal “logic” of this “pas de deux” plays out in another area: On the telephone 
when people have no visual contact to each other! Here are some of Schegloff’s 
examples:  
 
Example (6) TG, 1 (Schegloff, 1979: #42) 
1 ((ring)) 
2 Ava: H’llo:? 
3 Bea: –> hHi:, 
4 Ava: Hi:? 
 
Example (7) NB, #114 (Schegloff, 1979: #44) 
5 ((ring)) 
6 Cla: Hello::, 
7 Agn: –> Hi:::, 
8 Cla: Oh: hi:: ‘ow are you Agne::s, 
 
Example (8) HG 2 
9 1 ((ring)) 
10 2 Nan: H’llo::? 
11 3 Hyl: –> Hi:, 
12 4 Nan: HI::.” (Schegloff, 2007, p. 133) 
 
These examples clearly demonstrate the same pattern of “pas de deux” on telephone 
calls as when meeting on the university campus. From the senses of seeing to the 
sense we encounter the same transmodal pattern. 
Schegloff explains: 




In their first turn, callers do a greeting that in the first instance claims to have 
recognized the answerer as the person they meant to reach, and which also provides a 
voice sample to the answerer from which callers, in effect, propose and require that the 
answerer recognize them. In these three instances, it is about as small a voice sample 
as it could be; some callers are a bit more generous and say ‘hello’, providing the 
answerer with two syllables from which to recognize. In these three instances, and in a 
great many more, it works. With no hearable delay, answerers return the greeting in 
the next turn, which serves not only to reciprocate the greeting, but to claim that 
answerers have reciprocated the recognition as well. The operative word here is 
‘claim’; in Example (7) Clara shows that she has recognized the caller (her sister) by 
addressing her by name; in Example (6) and (8), no such demonstration is provided. 
(p. 133) 
 
These examples display interesting dimensions of CA-research for psychoanalytic topics 
and theorizing. Freud’s programmatic declaration that the essential part of the Ego is the 
body today is worked through in other fields under the heading of “embodiment” research 
(Pfeifer & Leuzinger-Bohleber, 1986). From Schegloff’s fresh analysis one can get an 
impression of how this sensual “transference” from “seeing-each-other” to “calling-each-
other” might work. The same pattern of “pas de deux” is executed and it is this kind of 
pattern we look for in psychoanalytic practice. 
 
We mention just one example (Emde, 1988) here from the rich body of evidence in infant 
research. The baby is given into his open mouth a nubbly dummy without the possibility 
to see it before. The baby feels the dummy is different. After the dummy is removed the 
baby sees several pictures of dummies on a screen. The baby stares longest when it sees 
the picture of a nubbly dummy. She makes a kind of “conclusion” from one sensual 
experience to the other, from the mouth to visual perception. This mental “gestalt” 
(Bernfeld 1934) confirms what Freud had in mind when he spoke of “transference” in his 
first versions – from one sensual modality to another. Or, in Schegloff’s example, from 
one encounter on a University Campus to another when starting a telephone call. Or, as 
Emde (1988) formulated, from relationships to “relationships on relationships”. Infant 
researchers show in this kind of experimenting an observation and the baby’s “method” 
to proceed from the observable to the unobservable. We see how mind comes into sensual 
experience, works in sensual transference and then up to relationships on relationships.  
 
Nobody would conclude that Schegloff’s observation of “pas de deux” in gaze-to-gaze-
movement and then in acoustic verbal exchanges while starting a telephone call would be 




“regressive” and “baby-like”. No, one can learn that these processes are elementary and 
constitutive for the beginning of new interactions. 
 
Resistance in Conversation 
There is an important debate what basic psychoanalytical concepts mean. Spurling 
(2008), in reviewing some famous case histories asks himself why he in his consulting 
room does not encounter the phenomenon of “regression” which is to appear regularly 
according to authors like Winnicott he re-reads? He concludes that in regression there is 
much contribution from the therapist’s side. At the same conclusion arrive other 
psychoanalyst (Minolli, 2004; Rousillion, 2010; Wainrib, 2012), when reconsidering the 
phenomena of narcissism. Kächele et al. (2009) insist that psychoanalytic concepts have 
value only when they can be precisely documented in conversational practice in the 
consulting room. Convincingly they documented how by tape-recording of analytical 
session complex levels of psychoanalytic treatment can contribute to theoretical debates. 
Clinical facts can be documented when analysts give up their resistance against tape-
recording of sessions. There is a small, but growing body of CA-literature on resistance. 
Gerhardt & Stinson (1995) have shown how ambivalently the concept of resistance can 
be used as a basic operation for a patient’s striving for autonomy or as opposing a 
method. Others (Fleisher Feldman, 1995; Caplan, 1995) have responded to this exposed 
alternative but the conclusion was that there is no “objectivity” in defining resistance; 
everything depends on the analyst’s emotional and epistemological position.  
 
 “Resistance” has been borrowed from psychoanalysis generating productive 
conversational research in related fields as advice giving, e.g., in medical conversation, 
genetic counseling, telephone help services and the like. How do professionals in these 
areas deal with resistance? Hepburn and Potter (2011) describe three practices: 
a) Resisted advice is packed in a more idiomatic form 
b) Sometimes a “tag” is added so that the listeners is defined as someone who 
already knows the relevant version 
c) The counselor dampens down the requirement for a response by “continuing past 
the transition place”  (p. 217). 
 
To give advice has a normative dimension and it is asymmetric. The advice giver defines 
himself as someone who claims to know how things are done “right”. These interactional 
dimensions are handled by the three practices described. The difference to the 
psychoanalytic notion of resistance is not huge. To overcome resistance also in 
psychoanalysis means to make the patient accept the momentary asymmetry and to 
accept that the analyst might be “right” – and the analyst tries to balance this asymmetry 
by verbal activities of the kind described. Resistance can be aggravated by the 
conversation format of how a patient’s problem is formulated (Morris, 2005). In 
question-driven therapies resistance is aggravated by this kind of conducting therapy 
(MacMartin, 2008). Patients find covert modes to resist advice while they openly consent. 
Hepburn and Potter (2011, p. 221) describe an “endemic epistemic asymmetry” – the 
advice giver in telephone emergency calls never has a full picture and the caller can 
withdrew to informations not yet or never given. The advice giver never gains control 
whether his advice is followed or not. This might operate in psychoanalytic 
conversations, too. Vehviläinen (2008), contributing with the first article on CA about 
resistance in psychoanalysis, describes the “interpretative trajectory”: 
 




The analyst does preparatory work to create the relevance, and an interactional ‘slot’, 
for the interpretation, thereby co-constructing it with the client. Connections and 
contradictions in the associated materials, pointed by the analyst, provide puzzles: 
noteworthy, enigmatic issues calling for exploration and explanation. In a stepwise 
manner, the analyst treats some aspects of the client’s talk as worth exploring. The 
interpretative statements that typically follow attend to these puzzles, providing 
explanations. They draw on the materials the client has provided, but reorganize them 
or add something new. This is, then, the core interactional practice of showing the 
client something that she or he ‘has not been aware of’… (pp. 121-122) 
 
This trajectory is not a theoretical description but substantiated by a series of transcribed 
data. Thus we have two basic operative procedures in dealing with resistance: First, the 
analyst uses the client’s material but arranges it in a new way. Second, the analyst adds 
something new, a new perspective or a new combination with other materials the client 
had delivered in earlier moments. We propose to term these practices under the headline 
of “changing the frame”-procedures with a notable aspect: the new frame has to be made 
relevant for the client in order to be accepted. Here, Vehviläinen is right in speaking of 
analysts solving puzzles. Vehviläinen (p. 137) points out that the analyst’s task to figure 
out the puzzles in a client’s talk must provoke “trouble”, attempts to justify oneself, to 
rationalize or to defend oneself in other manners. These practices show how 
psychoanalysis makes clients accountable for actions where accountability has been 
denied. This involves risky aspects of being blamed. But, of course, it is inavoidable. So, 
how this is done becomes a question of enormous practical relevance. We are at the 
beginning here. Freud was right, when he saw a cornerstone of psychoanalysis in the 
concept of resistance and claiming that the whole psychoanalytic theory is built on this 
concept.  
 
From today’s point of view it might be worth considering that theory is a necessary 
protective resource for this special kind of conversation psychoanalysts try to conduct 
every day. In his 6-days-a-week practice Freud (1913, p. 460) observed what he called 
the “Monday crust”, the patient reappearing a little bit hardened as compared to the 
Saturday session. But the humorous metaphor of “Monday crust” clearly is more than an 
observation. It serves as a means to continue with a practice Freud called in other 
writings as an “impossible profession”.  
 
Talk in Professional Psychoanalytic Practice 
We hear and see what can be heard and seen and listened to and in everyday interaction 
we turn our attention away from things which co-interactants commonly exclude – these 
things are “categorized” as “not-relevant to what-is-going-on”. In contrast, as 




psychoanalysts we try to re-mind what has been excluded from conversation, we pay 
special attention to what was made strange and try to re-member these elements. We 
strive to catch for the invisible – but we can catch it only when we are attentive to what is 
simply “documented” in what can be heard and seen. The “behavioral” dimension of 
conversation is just the access to the so important invisible dimension which we term the 
Unconscious. Here CA-research and psychoanalytic intuitions converge. In this 
paragraph we follow the work of Peräkylä for some convincing demonstrations. 
 
Traditional domains of CA are medical communication, in court, in classrooms – 
summarized as “institutional communication”. In institutions of that kind on can find 
conversational routines which make deviances meaningful. Obviously, psychotherapeutic 
communication cannot be subsumed under the headline of “institutional conversation” in 
general. The variations from analytic dyad to analytic dyad are immense.  
 
But, there are of course routine parts as e.g., the way how to end a session. Most analysts 
use a standard formula like “Our time is over” or the like to end a session. In this standard 
routine lies a chance for deviance. When there was a touching session with tears or 
otherwise emotionally moving so that analyst and patient share a common experience 
sensitive analysts end a session in deviance from the standard formula. This deviance 
then is uploaded with an unsaid meaning as the patient can “co-read” the analyst’s being 
emotionally moved and his sharing of emotional experience during the session – but the 
analyst must not explicitly “inform” his patient about his participation. Sensitive analysts 
do this because intuitively they feel that to use a standard routine of “good bye” can be 
“heard as” a kind of cold neutrality. In anticipation of this possibly hurting “being heard 
as” the good-bye formula is changed. And, as it were, incidentally let the patient 
participate for a moment of the own emotional state. Without saying or telling, nor 
talking nor informing, it is no “communication”. It just violates a standard routine. 
Psychoanalytic conversation might be found in this “intermediate” region where 
something is “said” and “not said” in the same move. Everyday logic cannot think this 
“at the same time”. In everyday logic A=A and not A≠B. But in our conversations 
sometimes it happens that we meet another logic which comes close to what Freud (1900) 
in “The Interpretation of Dreams” had termed the primary process. The new discovery is 
that these characteristics of primary process appear not beyond or “behind” the 
conversational surface. They appear on the surface and we can direct our attention to 
them.  
 
When analyzing the use of metaphors in psychoanalytic dialogue (Buchholz, 1996) there 
is a similar observation. Metaphors operate on the base that A=B and A≠B. “His mind is 
a mill” means, of course, that his mind is not a mill. Stählin (1914) showed in order to 
understand the meaning of a metaphor it is important to develop a “consciousness of 
double meaning”. If one hears the sentence “He is gone crazy of love for her” and you 
expect to find the man in a psychiatric ward you have not understood the metaphor. To 
understand metaphors means to renounce the sentence of excluded third. Metaphors show 
that there is an excluded “Third” between formal structured logic. Metaphors (Ogden, 
1997; Borbely, 2008; Cacciari, 2008; Aragno, 2009; Buchholz, 1993) demonstrate this 
primary process logic on the surface of our talking. This kind of intuitively “catching” 
emotional hints is observed by Peräkylä (2011) in other examples of psychoanalytic 
conversation, too. 
 
Peräkylä (2013, p. 552) critizices this “going beyond” of what is said and done.  





While ordinarily in interaction, language and other signs are understood as means for 
displaying and recognizing the speaker’s communicative intentions…, in 
psychotherapy there is an endemic orientation in the therapist, and usually in the 
patient, to examine the patient’s talk beyond its intended meanings. 
 
Psychoanalysts’ practices can be described as using formulations. Formulations (Antaki, 
2008) are utterances which indicate in what way a speaker came to understand what in 
the other speaker’s turn has been said before. Using such formulations psychoanalysts do 
not exactly reproduce the words the patient used. They give meaning by slightly shifting 
utterances. They use turn-initial particles like “It seems as if you were …” or “It sounds 
like…”. The practical implication of such formulations is that they sound like saying the 
same and operate as “just-understanding”. But they do more. Vehviläinen (2003) sees 
that in such formulations a new content is packed in making a different (unconscious?) 
meaning for the hearer easier acceptable. 
 
Psychoanalysts expand meanings by repeating a patient’s words and add additional 
formulations: “You say this made you angry, but no feelings of being disappointed 
before?” or they make utterances like “You say it is hard. I think you mean painful”. Rae 
(2008) calls this a “lexical substitution” aiming to find the correct word for an emotional 
state and its intensity.  
 
Peräkylä (2011) made an interesting observation. The analyst’s formulation is spoken in a 
“first position”, the patient’s response illustrates a move from a “second position”. When 
analyzing the material of 58 audio-recorded sessions of psychoanalyses conducted by two 
psychoanalysts with 3 patients Peräkylä (2011) finds that analysts modify slightly what 
they have said in their first-position move. Sometimes they intensify the words for 
emotional experience or they additionally point to layers of experience not addressed to 
in the first-move-utterance before. These reformulations are not made explicitly with an 
accent on “this is right now!”, rather they come in a way to open a discrete opportunity 
for the patient to change how she understood the first interpretation given. Analysts 
contribute to the process by respecting the patient’s autonomy and at the same time 
intuitively demonstrate their adaptation to the patient’s response to the first interpretation 
given. Can this kind of micro-analyzing clear the difference between therapy and other 
forms of talk? The answer is yes and a short review can show this. 
 
CA in Psychoanalytic therapy Research 
One distinguishing feature is the amount questions from the therapist. Putting questions 
to someone has a multitude of conversational dimension of which we mention here only 
one: it responds to the silent question who holds the initiative? In question-answer 
therapies the conversation stops if no questions are posed or this threat is permanently 
present. In contrast, psychoanalysis has aimed to give the patient the power of initiative 
and thus to pose the analyst in a listening position. After silencing of some length 




therapists utter a “hm-hm”, obviously an attempt to bring themselves in a listener’s 
position (see first example below, line 5). 
 
Pittenger et al. (1960) in their research on “The First Five Minutes” established some 
principles of therapeutic talk (“recurrence”, “immanent reference”, “adjustment” (p. 229-
244) which demonstrate the firm wish to empirically base their intuition of difference in 
therapeutic talk on research data. Scheflen (1972) included in his analysis the bodily 
movements of hands and gestures and positioning which synchronized with 
conversational intent. His material was a detailed analysis of a family therapy session 
which influenced family therapy research of authors like Wynne (1984). Labov and 
Fanshel (1977) analyzed the first 15 minutes of session 25 observing four levels: a) the 
elements of text including all pauses; b) the elements of paralinguistic cues (p. 42) with 
which loudness, laughter, breath and rate was included; c) the level of “expansion” by 
bringing together verbal and paralinguistic data together with elements of the situation; d) 
the level of interaction by which participants identify their actions mutually. Their 
methodological instrument was speech-act theory. They come to formulate 4 basic types 
of conversational action: metacommunication, representation, request and challenge (p. 
77-110). Turner (1976) directed his attention to the question when a session does begin? 
What makes the difference between “informal” talk before the “official” work session 
starts? His material were group therapy sessions and he finds that in the informal first 
parts therapist omit those “second moves” to which they are urged after “official” session 
parts had started. This distinction is a complicated matter in handling psychoanalytic 
sessions. We have gathered three starts of psychoanalytic sessions from fully trained 
psychoanalysts, examples which demonstrate how important it is to draw the line 
between “informal” and “official” session. In all three examples one participant starts 
talking with a special demand: 
 
 
First example:  
13 T (male): Mrs R.,  t’day (.) I would let my cell phone online and if i:t were 
my family I wou::ld respond the call becau:z (..) my father is in the hospital 
14 (1,5) 
15 P (female):  My stepgrandfather too. I mea::n Irene’s father. A:lso (.) came 
today to the hospital 
16 (3) 
17 T: m:mh 
18 (7) 










20 P (male): well, at first uhm; next Tuesday (.) we could drop our session (-) 
or shift it.(1) Be::cause (-) I would have to attend another meeting  
21  ((P and T are laughing)) 
22 T (female): ä::uhm (1,5) ä::uhm we could shift it to Thursday 
23 P: Yeah:: okay::uhm it should work  (( stands up, walks to his bag and 
takes his blackberry out)) 
24 T: this is the 25th. 
25 P: also at seven pm or? That (.) sounds good (-) I ll put it down (-) to be on 
the safe side (--) perfect! 
26 (8) 
27 ((P and T are laughing)) 
28 P: tzen I ll switch off  (.) my machine(--) you really look good, relaxed 
29 T: thanks. ((laughs)) 
30 P: sun burned ((laughs))  
 
Third Example: 
31 T (male): Uhm::hh (..) I have a small info first (..), uhm 
32 (1) 
33 P (male): Yes:: 
34 T: It will ring any moment (.) someone will deliver at the door (-) I ll first 
have to open it  
35 (.) 
36 P: ((sighs)) 
37 T: that you (-) will be (.) prepared 
38 P: ((sighs, loud inspiration,)) 
39 (60) 
40 P: Yes: =I just had a nice experience and a surprise (reports a pleasurable 
situation with his wife) 
 
These examples have something in common and they are different. The three 
psychoanalysts follow the technical rule to begin a session with information about a 
change of the formal frame of the session if this should become necessary. These things 




happen in psychoanalytic sessions and it is, following Tuckett, not necessary to deal with 
it whether it is appropriate or not. CA has not the task to evaluate a procedure but to 
describe the steps by which conversation is organized. 
 
In the first example the therapist informs his client that he wants to learn what happens 
with his father in a hospital and that the session might probably be interrupted. The 
client’s answer is of a very ambivalent kind. Even after repeated careful listening to the 
tape it was not possible if this is a response of rivalry-in-suffering (My stepgrandfather 
too) or is it an utterance categorized as empathic with the analyst’s situation. The 
ambivalence of how to categorize the client’s response makes the analyst (line 5) attempt 
to bring himself into a listener’s position by uttering “m:mh” which produces no client’s 
response but a continuation of silence. After seven seconds the analyst tries an everyday 
start in order to overcome the line between the informal and the official part of the 
session. 
 
In the second example it is the client who wants to change the date of a session. With 
“well, at first uhm” he informs the analyst about his drawing a line between the two parts 
of the session, it is his categorizing activity. But here the analyst does not come to 
participate in drawing that line. The common laughter (in line 2 and 8) is a co-production 
of resistance against differentiating “informal” from “formal” parts of the session. The 
last chance to differentiate these two parts of a session is lost after the internal pause (--) 
in line 9. This is a turn-transition point, the client switches of his blackberry, informs the 
analyst about this activity and ends with a pause. If the analyst does not take the turn here 
this can be heard by the patient as a “silent continuer” - as if a “go on” is uttered. The 
client goes on with informal talk and makes his comments about the after-holiday fashion 
of his analyst. The analyst responds in a conventional everyday manner (“thanks”) and 
instantiates the patients hearing that the line between informal talk and official work is 
not yet established. This might further the patient’s courage to talk about his analyst or it 
might lead to an aggravation of this kind of resistance.  
 
The third example starts in a similar way like the first. The analyst does not have such a 
justifying account as if he expects the session to become interrupted because of a father in 
hospital. But he justifies his pre-session information in a similar fashion (line 7: “that you 
(-) will be (.) prepared”). The patient moans several times, the therapist does not actively 
try to restart conversation. After a “felt long” pause of 60 seconds it is the patient who 
takes his initiative. 
 
These examples might serve as an illustration as to how CA can help to clearly analyze 
the enormous difficulties to cope with in psychoanalytic practice. It is not only 
sequentiality of turn-taking, it is category-bound activity (to differentiate the informal 
from the formal part of the session) as well as mutually reading intentions of both 
participants (including unconscious intentions) that has to be skillfully managed in 
professional practice. In psychoanalytic practice more happens than just “giving 
interpretations”.  
 
This early discovery originated from a project on “discursive structures in psychoanalytic 
therapy” (Flader et al. 1982) showing special properties of psychoanalytic conversation: 
a) a specialization of mental participation in dialogue; b) deviant participation structures 
simply as to the amount of verbal activity by the therapist; c) therapists exhibit unusual 
conversation practices in long silences and non-responding to questions; d) both 




participants need time for establishing their special kind of cooperation; e) finally, the 
question of asymmetric anonymity.  
 
These authors used the concept of “defense” for explaining certain conversational 
features instead of analyzing how this acts in conversation itself. One task they described 
might be remembered because of its practical value: Patients at the beginning of 
treatment have to be socialized into that special kind of conversation tolerating deviances 
from everyday expectations as not answering, long pauses and the analyst’s attempt to 
keep secure his anonymity. There is training in specialized conversational practices than 
only gaining “insight”. A patient cannot, as in most conversational opportunities of other 
kind, select the analyst as a next speaker. The patient might put a question to the analyst 
and make the experience not to receive an answer. Spence et al. (1994), while 
“monitoring the analytic surface” observed a related phenomenon. They were interested 
in just one type of utterance when a patient directly addresses his analyst by sentences 
like “I think of yesterday when you said…” This connection of “I” and “you” in close 
approximation in one sentence can be easily detected. They find that there are sessions 
with a lot of such sentences (“related hours”) and sessions without any (“isolated hours”). 
The important conversational feature is: in “related hours” the analyst does not only 
speak more, but earlier in the session. 
 
The phenomenon once found it is not difficult to explain. When the analyst is directly 
addressed this exerts a certain conversational pressure to respond. This kind of research 
detects a phenomenon of how the analyst is steered by his patient’s utterance format. And 
this phenomenon must be conversationally unconscious. Up to now it had not been 
described in textbooks and it is not a documented part of treatment technique – but it 
operates in psychoanalytic conversation. 
 
Grabhorn et al. (2005) analyze speech of an anorectic patient during a 12-week treatment 
in a psychotherapeutic ward. At the beginning of treatment they find high levels of 
resistance indicated by the SASB-method (Benjamin, 1974); in the middle of treatment 
resistance gradually disappears and a therapeutic alliance can be built up. At the end they 
find more autonomy. Spence et al.’s (1994) findings are more fine grained: in the 
beginning of treatment this patient used the addressing of the therapist very often, 
clinically this indicated low levels of autonomy and autoplastic adaption to treatment 
conditions. When in the middle phase of treatment the conversation phenomenon 
disappeared this was clinically interpreted as a necessary self-reorganizational retreat; the 
reappearance of addressing the therapist was considered as a new step in autonomy.  
 
CA – Opening a New Way between the Scylla of 
Hermeneutics and the Charybdis of Science 
So far we have reviewed relevant CA-research and included some excerpts of our own 
study in order to show that the distinction of metacommunication, representation, request 
and challenge, as described by Labov and Fanshel (1977) would not suffice to fully 
describe the complex phenomena here. More mental or cognitive dimensions like 
category-bound activity, sequentiality or unconsciously luring of the analyst’s response 
cannot be described within the framework of Labov & Fanshel’s early work. CA 
underlines that patients need confirmation and ratification by the other subject. This 
reminds one of Tomasellos (2008) differentiation between types of conversation as 




inform, request and sharing. According to this author the ability to share (information, 
perspective, knowledge) is a human condition and not found in apes. 
 
Addressed in this line of research is a very relevant aspect of process research: how 
conversational and cognitive processing relate to each other. Hepburn and Potter (2011) 
regret in the period of developing one’s own research strategies, “conversation analytic 
work has not attended to cognitive matters” (p. 219). Today CA-research addresses the 
psychological more directly. Analyzing category-bound activity during conversation 
characterizes the interface of CA and psychoanalysis. 
 
This is a very delicate domain as it is traditionally assumed that talk follows other rules 
than mental and cognitive processes, that thinking is much faster than talking and that 
both have very different capabilities. Psychoanalysis is somewhat “mentalistic” while 
conversation is seen as outward directed and concerned with the observable only. If 
things are left in this way conversation and psyche could never be brought together. This 
is obviously a false conception as people at least in therapies strive for letting another 
person know what they feel is in their psyche. So a way must be found to bring both sides 
together without giving up methodological rigorism and precision of observation. 
 
Peräyklä (2011), experienced in both practices of analysis, proposes as a third way to 
overcome the dichotomy of “inner” and “outer” experience and to see this difference as 
one produced by cultural and conversational practice. He defines psychoanalysis  
 
as a practice in which the client and the analyst explore their inner experiences, and 
step by step either recognise dimensions of affect and cognition that appear for them 
as ones that have always been there but have not been perceived with clarity before, or 
achieve new dimensions of affect and cognition that are real but have not been 
possible to be experienced before the psychoanalytic process. In short, feelings, 
thoughts, hopes, desires appear as real phenomena in psychoanalytic practice – not 
merely as artefacts or projections produced by linguistic and interactive processes in 
the consultation room or elsewhere (p. 237). 
 
He comes to propose a new sight. The “inner” world and its difference to the outer world 
are demarcated by a symbolic and interactive border. Here operates a category-bound 
activity of a very important kind. This border is in itself constituted by conversational and 
interactive practice defining an individual’s personal, private, “inner” sphere and it is a 
culturally widespread distinction. In case of a projection this inner sphere is outside of the 
individual, in case of introjections the outside world is inside.  
 
Self and conversation can be considered as the two sides of a coin: the system of mutual 
affective regulation. Interactional and more psychological (“inner”) processes of 




regulation can be brought together. The details of this “come together” are tasks for the 
future. Here we offer a perspective to analyze process dimensions of psychoanalytic talk 
from both sides: from conversation and psychoanalysis. The psychoanalyst´s responses to 
a patient are describable as related to contexts which are self produced for the moment, 
emerging and then fading away replaced by new contexts in and by conversation. Thus, a 
central problem of psychoanalysis can be brought closer to a solution: How is the 
relationship between a general theory and a practice which operates helpful only when 
the individual dimension of the unconscious is approached and can be recognized, 
addressed, touched and seen? This dilemma of general theory and individual truth is 
contained in the ongoing and never ending controversy about the question: is 
psychoanalysis a science or is it hermeneutics? (Thomä & Kächele, 1975).  
 
This controversy goes back to the German philosopher’s Wilhelm Dilthey distinction 
between these types of scientific endeavor and it lasts on to our days (Boesky 2008). One 
could conclude that the two models of “hermeneutic” and “science” are in itself 
insufficient. A psychoanalyst does not “interprete a text” and he does not “apply” a 
general theory to an individual patient. Merton Gill remarked that to apply a theory in 
psychoanalytic consultation equals like having earwax in the third ear. Both, hermeneutic 
and science, differently appreciate the subjective dimension of human existence. While 
hermeneutic positions favor this dimension they are rebuked for this as they never could 
achieve in a mature position in academic controversies; while scientific positions claim to 
work scientifically they are rebuked from the other side to ignore individual suffering, 
meanings, dimensions. If human beings were fully determined by the laws of nature there 
would be no place for subjectivity and individual decisions; if human beings were fully 
“free” in every respect one never could substantiate human sciences. This controversy 
became part of repetition compulsion in psychoanalytic generation building. Same topics 
are treated again and again in every new generation and clearing up operations in 
theoretical questions that have been solved are widely left out. The most serious 
consequence was that psychoanalysis did not evolve a research paradigm in its own right. 
Both positions suffer from a fundamental inability to conceptualize a basic dimension of 
humanity, which is the social dimension expressed in conversation and interaction. It is in 
this social dimension only that we are constituted as individual persons with a personal 
history brought into new interactive encounters with others who contribute to change our 
conceptions of who and how we are. It is time to include a (micro-)social dimension into 
psychoanalytic theorizing and give it a more central place. This enables psychoanalysis to 
give answers to what “clinical facts” are. Psychoanalysis and its clinical facts are locally 
produced, naturally organized, reflectively accountable, ongoing in practical 
achievement, always, only, exactly and entirely, by participants’ work in and during 
sessions - this is the fundamental phenomenon. 
 
Psychoanalytic process research seeks to provide detailed analyses of the assemblages of 
practices which are partially based on tacit knowledge through which the work of 
accomplishing local “social order” of an individual psychoanalysis is achieved. It is as 
Winnicott wrote that there is no baby without its mother. And there is no psychoanalytic 
patient without an analyst. We can turn this statement around: there is no analyst without 
a patient. Both must come together to produce what we consider as psychoanalysis. This 
production is a social phenomenon including hidden dimensions of conversation, of tacit 
knowledge and individual skillfulness on both sides. We can approach the riddle of 
“clinical facts” when we begin to consider the dyadic nature of the psychoanalytic 
endeavor. And CA is a powerful tool for psychoanalysis. The “common ground” of 




psychoanalysis might neither be Oedipus theory nor early envy, neither repetition 
compulsion nor death instinct, neither phantasy nor reality and what other conflictual 
themes might come to mind. This all is on the level of theory “applied”.  
 
Our theoretical conceptions allow a huge range of individual variability of technique 
embedded in an enormous amount of individual variability of patients and analysts. 
Debates might receive a new and fresh drive when psychoanalytic treatments are 
conceptualized as social patterns of relating and affiliating, of formulations and 
reformulations, of discovery and interpretation. Including more strictly the social 
dimension might help to join a research program that has begun to show that some of our 
most urgent problems can be brought closer to a helpful solution. If hermeneutics and 
science are two sides of a coin the whole debate always saw one side covered in the dark, 
either hermeneutics or science, either subjective dimensions or the more general law, 
either individual meanings or the more general theory. To bring this coin to stand up in 
order to make both sides visible will demand to give this coin the knack: to make it turn 
as fast as possible by conversation and other social influences. There is no standstill.  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